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REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT, DETERMINATIVE 
JUDGMENT, AND THE PROBLEM OF 
PARTICULARITY 
ANGELICA NUZZO

 
What I set out to do in this essay is something modest, spanning a 
limited textual range—sections four through five of the First Introduction 
in Kant’s Critique of Judgment1—to put forth a broader claim concerning 
the central problem of the Critique of Judgment as a Kritik der 
Urteilskraft. The question of the new distinction between ―determinant‖ 
and ―reflective‖ Urteilskraft is at stake. In these sections, Kant introduces 
and advances the problem of judgment beyond the results of the first 
Critique—and, more precisely, beyond what is now perceived as the gap 
left open by this work. Thereby it supports the view of Urteilskraft as an 
independent cognitive faculty endowed with an a priori principle of its 
own that is fundamentally distinct from the faculty of the understanding.  
In sections one through three of the First Introduction, Kant argues 
that, in order to set foot on the territory disclosed by a third ―critique,‖ 
further conditions are required than those provided by the critique of 
speculative and practical reason. Accordingly, in section four he 
introduces the conditions under which the realm of nature’s manifold 
empirical forms can first be conceived, while in section five he indicates in 
this realm the peculiar jurisdiction proper to the faculty of judgment in its 
distinctive transcendental features. The chief question of the Critique of 
Judgment regards the possibility of empirical knowledge insofar as this 
implies a reflection upon empirically given, contingent individual cases, a 
reflection capable of attributing to these cases sense and meaning within 
 
 
  Professor of Philosophy, Graduate Center and Brooklyn College (City University of New 
York). Recipient of a Tow Professorship (2012–13), a Mellon Fellowship in the Humanities (2007–
08), and an Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship (2005–06), and Fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for 
Advanced Studies at Harvard (2000–01). Among the author’s publications are: HISTORY, MEMORY, 
JUSTICE IN HEGEL (2012); HEGEL ON RELIGION AND POLITICS (ed. 2012); HEGEL AND THE ANALYTIC 
TRADITION (ed. 2009); IDEAL EMBODIMENT: KANT’S THEORY OF SENSIBILITY (2008); KANT AND THE 
UNITY OF REASON (2005); LOGICA E SISTEMA (1996); RAPPRESENTAZIONE E CONCETTO NELLA 
LOGICA DELLA FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO (1990); SYSTEM (2003). All translations are by the author 
unless otherwise identified. 
 1. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 208’-16’, at 397–404 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., 
1987) (1790) [hereinafter KANT, JUDGMENT]. Page references, e.g., 208’-16’, are to the Akademie 
edition, with the primed numbers referring to volume 20 and the unprimed numbers referring to 
volume 5 of the Akademie edition. The second page number, e.g., 397–404, refers to the corresponding 
page in the 1987 Pluhar edition, as translated by Pluhar and not by the author. However, the author’s 
translation appears in this article. 
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the systematic framework of a lawful structure of order. Such reflection 
underlies the procedures of scientific induction, and is the transcendental 
common ground of judgments of taste and teleological judgments more 
generally. At stake in all these cases is the peculiar way that humans have 
of making sense of nature in its particular and contingent manifestations. 
In Kant’s view, this kind of reflective cognition hinges on the possibility 
of thinking the given particulars as inscribed, despite their contingency, 
within a certain lawful order. The problem that this cognition raises lies in 
the fact that such lawful order is neither pre-determined by one of the 
cognitive faculties, nor can it be derived from the given particular. In 
presenting this problem, Kant reconsiders the results of the first Critique 
and integrates them with a new notion of ―nature‖ and a new concept of 
―experience.‖ The jurisdiction of the Critique of Judgment is no longer 
―nature in general‖ and is not sufficiently described if presented 
exclusively as the world ruled by the universal laws of nature brought to 
light by the understanding’s a priori legislation. The new realm under 
investigation is the seemingly chaotic ―labyrinth‖ of an infinite 
multiplicity of empirical forms for which only particular, empirical laws 
can be formulated. It is a random collection of manifold phenomena 
whose possible connection into the unitary picture of a ―world‖ and a 
unitary ―nature‖ is precisely the problem at issue. This is the problem that 
elicits the dramatic questions that Kant raises in these sections: How can 
we orient ourselves in the labyrinth that nature has now become for us; 
how is a coherent and unitary (and systematic) experience possible in—
and of—the manifold of nature’s empirical and contingent manifestations? 
In these questions lies the deeper motivation of the new critical 
investigation; from them hinges the overall development of the Critique of 
Judgment. In sections four through five Kant finally isolates the issue that 
we already find adumbrated but not yet directly addressed in an important 
footnote of section two.
2
 Key to its answer is now the idea of the reflective 
faculty of judgment and its a priori principle of formal purposiveness. 
In what follows, I present the development of Kant’s argument in 
section four of the First Introduction and discuss the relation between 
Kant’s general account of Urteilskraft in the introduction to the Analytic 
of Principles of the Critique of Pure Reason and his distinction between 
determinant and reflective faculty of judgment in the introductory sections 
of the Critique of Judgment. My aim is to bring to light the novelty of the 
idea of reflektierende Urteilskraft and its a priori principle in relation to 
 
 
 2. See id. at 204’ n.13, at 393. The note will be discussed extensively below.  
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the horizon of the first Critique, and to show the extent to which the 1790 
work advances the argument made by Kant in 1787. The crucial issue 
posed by the manifold forms of nature and its empirical laws—which, if 
not addressed, is indeed a radical ―threat‖ to the idea of ―nature in general‖ 
established by the first Critique—is taken up in connection with section 
five of the First Introduction. 
I. DETERMINANT AND REFLECTIVE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT: THE 
STARTING POINT OF A KRITIK DER URTEILSKRAFT 
In the conclusion of section three of the Introduction to the Critique of 
Judgment, Kant suggests ―all we may have to say of the faculty of 
judgment’s own principles must be ascribed to the theoretical part of 
philosophy.‖3 The faculty of judgment ―in general‖ is the ―faculty of 
thinking the particular as contained under the universal.‖4 That is to say, 
judgment establishes a relation between the particular and the universal—
the particular being a case or instance, and the universal being the concept, 
rule or principle, law or maxim.
5
 Urteilskraft überhaupt connects 
particular cases to the general laws that apply to those cases, and connects 
universal laws with the particular cases that instantiate those laws. This 
connection can take place in two different ways. If the universal law, rule 
or principle ―is given‖ by the understanding as the faculty of principles, 
then the faculty of judgment’s task is simply—and exclusively—that of 
―subsuming‖ the particular case under the given universal. To be sure, in 
this situation, what is given to the faculty of judgment is not only the rule 
but also the case—both the particular and the universal are given. 
Provided with both, judgment has the task of bringing the particular 
instance to the universal under which it is contained. Thereby the 
particular is thought precisely as an instance of the given law. Kant names 
this activity of judgment ―determinant‖ (bestimmende). The general 
concept is determined by the particular case to which it applies as the rule 
for that instance; the case is determined as a case of that law.
6
 
 
 
 3. Id. at 179, at 18.  
 4. Id. 
 5. See Hanna Ginsborg, Thinking the Particular as Contained under the Universal, in 
AESTHETICS AND COGNITION IN KANT’S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 35 (Rebecca Kukla ed., 2006) for an 
analysis of what the universal is; Thomas Teufel, Kant’s Sensationalist Conception of Particularity in 
the Critique of the (Reflecting) Power of Judgment, KANT STUDIES ONLINE (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://www.kantstudiesonline.net/KSO_Author_files/TeufelThomas01211.pdf for a discussion of what 
―the particular‖ is. 
 6. See KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 1, at 211, at 54 (illustrating that the faculty of judgment 
determines the ―concept that lays to the ground through a given empirical representation‖). 
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―Determination,‖ explains Kant in the first Critique, ―is a predicate that is 
added to the concept of the subject and extends it.‖7 
This operation describes the ―transcendental faculty of judgment‖ at 
work in the first Critique. Such faculty ―provides a priori the conditions‖ 
that justify the subsumption under the given law.
8
 More precisely, 
however, transcendental philosophy (and specifically transcendental logic) 
does not provide the rule directly, but the ―general conditions for rules,‖9 
setting the discussion on a more original level. 
If, on the contrary, ―only the particular is given‖ (and not, as in the case 
of the determinant faculty of judgment, both the particular and the 
universal), then the faculty of judgment must first of all ―find‖ the 
universal for that particular instance, i.e., must find the universal concept 
―made possible‖ by that particular instance.10 This task must obviously be 
fulfilled before all other further operation of judgment can take place, 
thereby becoming judgment’s most fundamental and defining task. Since 
in this case no determination of objects takes place but only ―reflection,‖ 
the faculty of judgment is here ―merely reflective.‖11  
The distinction between determinant and reflective judgment is the 
distinction between application and acquisition of concepts or general 
rules. In section three of the First Introduction, Kant describes the faculty 
of judgment’s peculiar relation to law as a ―searching for laws‖12 and 
contrasts judgment to the understanding’s and reason’s ―legislation,‖ 
which is the act of giving law. The latter are faculties legislative over an 
objective order. Judgment by contrast is only self-legislating; properly, it 
is a heuristic faculty with regard to law.  
In section four the task of ―finding‖ the law is indicated, more 
precisely, as the specific activity of the reflective faculty of judgment.
13
 
This connection to law reveals that it is the reflective faculty of judgment 
that interests Kant specifically in the Critique of Judgment as an 
autonomous cognitive faculty. The relevant point is that determinant and 
reflective faculties of judgment do not stand to each other as parallel 
 
 
 7. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, B626, at 566–67 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. 
Wood eds. & trans., 1998) (2d ed. 1787) [hereinafter KANT, PURE REASON]. Page references, e.g., 
B626, are to the first (A) and second (B) editions, or both where applicable. The second page number, 
e.g., 397–404, refers to the corresponding page in the 1998 Guyer and Wood edition, as translated by 
Guyer and Wood, and not by the author. However, the author’s translation appears in this article. 
 8. KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 1, at 179, at 18–19. 
 9. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A135/B174, at 269. 
 10. KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 1, at 179, at 18–19; see also id. at 211’, at 399. 
 11. Id. at 179, at 18–19. 
 12. Id. at 177, at 16. 
 13. See id. at 179–81, at 18–20.  
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functions of a faculty of judgment in general. In the opening passage of 
the section, it becomes clear why the Urteilskraft that occupies the 
Critique of Judgment can only be the reflective faculty of judgment. For 
one thing, the meaning of the ―givenness‖ respectively of the rule and the 
instance with which judgment operates is different in the case of 
determinant and reflective Urteilskraft because different is the source from 
which they are given. For determinant judgment, the fact that the rule is 
given means that the faculty of judgment has only to execute or apply an a 
priori rule whose source is the understanding. For reflective judgment, by 
contrast, the givenness of the particular has an exclusively empirical 
meaning. It is only experience that can provide a posteriori the specific 
case—and this is also all reflective judgment can count on (for only the 
particular is given to it). In other words, the reflective faculty of judgment 
has its necessary starting point in experience; judgment’s activity is not 
dependent on principles or cases offered by any other mental power. 
Hence the crucial issue in this case is not that of thinking the particular as 
contained under the universal but rather that of finding the universal for a 
given empirical particular. This is, in fact, quite a complicated task: the 
universal must be found. But this universal must be precisely the rule 
required by that specific given empirical case. 
II. UNDERSTANDING AND JUDGMENT: TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC AND THE 
PROBLEM OF STUPIDITY  
In the transcendental logic of the first Critique, in the introductory 
section ―On the Transcendental Faculty of Judgment in General,‖ Kant 
defines Urteilskraft überhaupt as the ―faculty of subsuming under rules, 
i.e., of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a 
given rule (casus datae legis).‖14 The rule is given by the understanding as 
―faculty of rules.‖15 Judgment is in charge of distinguishing whether the 
given rule applies to the case at hand. Subsumption is judgment’s proper 
task. It is the act of bringing the particular under the universal or the 
representation of an object under a concept. Kant identifies the crucial 
problem of this faculty from the outset: Urteilskraft is the faculty of 
subsuming under rules, and yet there is no rule for subsuming. The 
understanding gives the rule under which to subsume but there is no 
 
 
 14. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A132/B171, at 268. 
 15. See KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A126, at 242 for the various definitions of 
Verstand, among which ―faculty of rules‖ is seen as ―more fruitful‖ and, as such, to better render the 
nature of the understanding. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
12 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 6:7 
 
 
 
 
objective rule that can teach the faculty of judgment how to perform the 
subsumption correctly. In other words, the activity of subsumption under 
rules does not itself seem to stand under any rule. This leaves judgment, 
which is otherwise provided with both the universal and the case, in a 
precarious position.  
Kant distinguishes the role of the faculty of judgment in general logic 
from its function in transcendental logic. ―General logic contains, and can 
contain, no rules for the faculty of judgment.‖16 Making abstraction from 
all content of cognition, general logic is a merely analytical exposition of 
the forms of thinking: concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, in which ―all 
employment of the understanding‖ ultimately consists. The faculty of 
judgment is thereby considered only insofar as the understanding’s formal 
employment is concerned. General logic, however, cannot give any 
prescription or rule as to how to operate the subsumption (for this would 
require yet another rule in a regressus ad infinitum).
17
 There seem to be 
only two ways out of this predicament: either to declare that the faculty of 
judgment is a peculiar ―natural talent‖18 that cannot be taught but only 
practiced—either one is naturally endowed with it or there is no way one 
can successively acquire it—or to declare that the faculty of judgment is 
an a priori faculty that finds in itself and gives to itself its own a priori 
principle or rule. The Critique of Pure Reason suggests the first solution; 
the Critique of Judgment advances, for the first time, the second. 
The problem that judgment faces given the lack of rules for subsuming 
is, Kant suggests, the problem of ―stupidity.‖ For this he offers the erudite 
formulation of defect of secunda Petri: non legit secundam Petri (i.e., ―he 
did not read the second part of Petrus Ramus’ Dialectica on judgment‖), 
being an erudite and elliptical way of referring to someone as an 
imbecile.
19
 Indeed, stupidity is the lack of ―natural judgment‖ and for it 
there is no remedy: 
A dull or narrow-minded person, to whom nothing is wanting but a 
proper degree of understanding, may be improved by tuition, even 
 
 
 16. Id. at A132/B171, at 268. 
 17. See KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 1, at 169, at 6–7 (Preface to the Akademie edition). In a 
different context, Ginsborg insists on the idea of ―natural disposition,‖ which would bring Kant closer 
to Hume (at stake is the discussion of the imaginative synthesis). See Ginsborg, supra note 5, at 51. 
The interesting point is that Ginsborg juxtaposes the natural disposition with the rule-governed mental 
activity in relation to an intersubjective demand. This latter constellation comes close to the one I hint 
at in relation to the position of the CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT. See also Ginsborg, supra note 5, at 58. 
 18. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A133-34/B172-73, at 269–70. 
 19. See Rémi Brague, Kant et la secunda Petri. Un contresens fréquent, 1999 REVUE DE 
MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE 419. 
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so far as to deserve the epithet of learned. But as such persons 
frequently labor under a deficiency in the faculty of judgment, it is 
not uncommon to find men extremely learned who in the 
application of their science betray in a lamentable degree this 
irremediable want.
20
  
Kant offers the examples of a physician, a judge, or a ruler who may 
very well know the universal rules and master all the concepts of the 
particular discipline, yet may still not be able to apply them correctly to 
particular and concrete cases. These are all instances of professional 
stupidity, which no doctrine can correct. Even examples from experience 
cannot produce judgment although they can sharpen judgment if one 
already has it (examples rather presuppose the capacity to judge). Most 
importantly, our professionals may lack the ability to distinguish ―whether 
a case in concreto belongs‖ to the universal in abstracto expressed by the 
rule; that is, they may not be able to judge of which rule a particular case 
is in fact a case. The faculty of judgment deals with the ―application‖ of 
the rule. To subsume under a rule means precisely to apply the rule to 
those given cases that can be correctly construed as cases of that rule.
21
 
The important point is that, from the fact that one may lack judgment but 
not understanding (and even doctrine)—i.e., that one may have the rule 
(and even the particular case) and still be unable to apply it—it follows 
that the two faculties of understanding and judgment are not reducible to 
one. This irreducibility holds true even within the framework of the 
transcendental logic of the first Critique when judgment is merely 
subsumptive and clearly not an independent cognitive faculty distinct from 
understanding. In this case, judgment’s defect or stupidity is exposed 
despite the fact that judgment still relies entirely on the understanding. The 
Critique of Judgment, with its discovery of the reflective faculty of 
judgment distinct from and this time independent of the understanding and 
its rules, will draw the ultimate conclusion from the lesson of stupidity. 
To be sure, this is the case in a significant additional sense. The 
question raised by the problem of stupidity presented in the first Critique 
is the following: given that judgment is a natural talent and that there are 
no rules for how to subsume correctly—no rules that can be imparted and 
 
 
 20. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A133/B172, at 268; see also IMMANUEL KANT, 
ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW 199, at 71 (Mary J. Gregor trans., 1974) (1797); 
see also the very beginning of IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in 
Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, 8:273, at 278, 8:275, at 279 (Mary 
J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1793). 
 21. See KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A134/B173, at 269, A137/B176, at 271–72. 
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no rules that can be taught—are we justified in our being stupid, i.e., does 
the claim of stupidity really end the infinite regress? This is obviously a de 
jure, not a de facto, question.
22
 Whereas logic can only answer 
affirmatively, the doctrine of reflective judgment provides Kant with the 
basis for a negative answer. There is no excuse or justification for 
stupidity because there is a universal principle—albeit a merely subjective 
one—that judgment gives to itself that enables it to inscribe the particular 
within its rule. What the first Critique indicates as a merely ―natural 
talent‖ in order to cut off the infinite regress in the rules for subsumption; 
in the Critique of Judgment this talent becomes the a priori principle of 
the independent and ―heautonomous‖ faculty of judgment. In this case, 
one’s individual judgment of taste is regarded as ―the example of a 
universal rule which cannot be stated.‖23 Although the rule cannot be 
known, there is an ultimate rule that has actual examples in the 
exemplarity of individual judgments of taste. Stupidity is not justified in 
this new framework; it has to confront itself with the broader and more 
complex horizon of sensus communis, and it is held in check by the 
condition of communicability of the judgment of taste. 
And yet, logic’s response to stupidity (or to the defect of secunda 
Petri) seems to require an additional distinction. If general logic can give 
no instruction as to how to emend the faculty of judgment (i.e., as to how 
to avoid stupidity by providing an objective rule for subsumption), it 
appears that transcendental logic, which deals with the content of 
knowledge instead of making abstraction from it, may have something to 
say with regard to the issue. Transcendental logic ―would seem to have as 
its peculiar task to correct and secure the faculty of judgment by means of 
determinate rules in the use of pure understanding.‖24 For ―transcendental 
philosophy has the peculiarity that besides the rule (or rather the universal 
condition of rules), which is given in the pure concept of the 
understanding, it can at the same time specify a priori the case to which 
each rule is to be applied.‖25 Does this claim solve the problem of 
judgment? The transcendental faculty of judgment provides the a priori 
conditions under which objects can be given as instances of the rule. These 
conditions are space, time, and the transcendental schemata. What results 
from this doctrine are the ―synthetic judgments which under these 
 
 
 22. See LUIGI SCARAVELLI, SCRITTI KANTIANI 403 (1973). 
 23. KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 1, at 237, at 85–87. 
 24. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A135/B174, at 269. 
 25. Id. at A135/B174-75, at 269–70. 
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conditions follow a priori from the pure concepts of understanding.‖26 The 
universal rule is provided by the category of the understanding. But since 
the particular is specified a priori as an instance of the rule, it cannot be 
the empirically given particular. In fact, Kant designates it as ―appearances 
in general.‖27 The particular to which the category is applied as a rule is 
sensible intuition insofar as it is schematized a priori through the 
transcendental determination of time. It follows that the synthetic a priori 
judgments or principles of the understanding formulated by the 
Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment (or Analytic of Principles) are not 
those same judgments that the physician, the judge, and the ruler need to 
correctly pronounce when facing concrete and particular empirical cases. 
Instead, the synthetic a priori judgments of the understanding are 
universal laws that contain in themselves no rule or principle as to how the 
faculty of judgment should carry out its subsumptions of empirically given 
cases. Thus, with regard to the issue that troubles the physician, the judge, 
and the ruler (casus datae legis) testing, alternatively, their intelligence or 
stupidity, transcendental logic offers no substantial advance over merely 
formal logic.
28
 In sum, this is the problem that logic (both general and 
transcendental logic) faces and that the Critique of Judgment inherits with 
regard to judgment: not only is there no rule for subsuming, but it is 
logically impossible to derive analytically from a particular case the rule 
by which one can ascend from that case to the law or principle under 
which that case stands (as its genus), just as it is impossible to derive 
analytically from a law or principle the rule for its application to a 
particular case. In other words, in both directions the rule according to 
which judgment must find the genus or apply the law requires a self-
standing and independent principle in the lack of which only the claim of a 
natural talent that one either has or does not have can be advanced. 
III. ―NATURE IN GENERAL‖ BECOMES A ―LABYRINTH‖—THE TASK OF 
THE REFLECTIVE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT 
The Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment is concerned with the 
understanding as the faculty of principles and its use in providing pure a 
priori cognition of ―nature in general.‖ In the first Critique the particular 
 
 
 26. Id. at A136/B175, at 270. 
 27. Id. at A139/B178, at 272. 
 28. In the framework of transcendental logic, however, their problem does not even seem to 
subsist. The a priori synthetic judgments of the understanding do not, after all, require the faculty of 
judgment as an independent faculty for their formulation. 
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empirical instance does not yet come to the fore. Accordingly, the activity 
of subsuming given empirical cases under concepts does not yet need to be 
carried out. The chief problem of the Critique, namely, the problem of the 
transcendental laws of nature, does not yet require the subsumption of 
empirically given particulars under rules since it deals with the conditions 
under which particulars can first be given to us at all. Thus, the first 
Critique provides the pure a priori conditions for all possible subsumption 
under a priori universal rules.
29
 In the Critique of Judgment, Kant 
identifies the logical procedure of the ―transcendental faculty of judgment‖ 
at work in the Analytic of Principles as the work of the determinant 
faculty of judgment. In defining this judgment in section four, Kant offers 
no specification of the type of particulars that are subsumed under the 
universal.
30
 The particular can be either appearance in general as the a 
priori instance specified by the understanding or the empirically given 
case. Although transcendental and determinant Urteilskraft are not 
identical, the two cases can be discussed together at this point since in 
both cases the faculty of judgment does not pose a problem of principles 
of its own. By claiming that the ―determinant‖ faculty of judgment, which 
operates under the universal transcendental laws given by the 
understanding, is ―subsumptive‖ only,31 Kant recognizes that determinant 
judgment as such does not raise any specific problem. For the ―only‖ task 
it has to perform is to subsume under the rule provided by the 
understanding without regard to the question of what is it that must be 
subsumed (i.e., it must simply decide whether or not a particular case in 
concreto falls under the universal in abstracto). 
The world of nature in general, established by the first Critique, and the 
procedure of subsumption under rules proper of the determinant faculty of 
judgment, still leave a broad realm of experience unaccounted for. Kant 
recognizes that the transcendental ―laws given a priori by the 
understanding‖ guarantee the ―possibility of a nature (as object of sense) 
in general‖ but still leave undetermined the great variety of possible 
applications (and ―modifications‖) of those ―universal transcendental 
concepts of nature.‖32 In this framework, no account can be given of the 
 
 
 29. See KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A135/B174, at 269; see also KANT, JUDGMENT, 
supra note 1, at 179, at 18–19. 
 30. See KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 1, at 207–09, at 48–51. Different is the case of section five 
of the Critique of Judgment, where Kant claims that the faculty of judgment determines the ―concepts 
that lay as the basis through a given empirical representation.‖ KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 1, at 
211, at 53. 
 31. KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 1, at 179, at 18–19.  
 32. Id. 
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manifold particular forms that nature displays. Thereby Kant juxtaposes 
the ―manifold forms‖ of nature that are expressed by the infinite variety of 
possible particular applications of the transcendental universal laws to the 
order legislated by the understanding, i.e., to those universal laws that 
constitute ―nature in general.‖ In other words, Kant discloses the existence 
of another nature for which the principles of the first Critique no longer 
provide a sufficient explanation. There is another nature within the realm 
of nature in general that cannot be analytically deduced from it since its 
order—assuming there is such an order—does not follow analytically from 
it. This is the world that the Critique of Judgment will populate with 
particular objects and new forms of experience—the experience of beauty 
and life. 
What is the epistemological problem that the Critique of Pure Reason 
leaves open to the independent, reflective faculty of judgment to solve? 
According to the Analytic of Principles, the understanding gives, for 
example, the transcendental law according to which all events in the world 
of nature’s appearances can be measured. This law does not contribute 
anything to the specific issue of how a particular given appearance that 
one has to measure must be compared with a given measurement standard. 
The Analytic proves that all appearance and intuition can be determined 
quantitatively. Yet, on the basis of this principle alone, no single given 
appearance or intuition can be quantitatively determined in its specificity. 
Similarly, in the case of the principle that every event has a cause, 
transcendental logic does not say what this cause specifically is or which 
among the many possible causes is the real cause.
33
 This is precisely the 
main issue in natural science (and in our particular actual experiences). 
The task of the first Critique is only to establish the objective validity 
of the universal order governing the physical world as the ―world‖ of 
possible experience or nature in general. As the understanding’s a priori 
synthetic judgments or universal laws of nature leave undetermined all the 
infinite empirical cases that can be counted under those laws, it follows 
that, in addition to the understanding, a particular faculty is needed that 
can effectively determine those particular empirical cases thereby lending 
to the world of nature in general its empirical specificity and concreteness. 
This faculty will be able to connect general laws with particular cases and 
particular cases with their general laws. This is the faculty of judgment 
that comes to the fore in the Critique of Judgment. 
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Since determinant judgment by simply executing the understanding’s 
rule ―is only subsumptive,‖ it can provide no real determination for those 
manifold, empirical forms of nature that are left, as it were, thoroughly 
―indeterminate.‖ At this juncture Kant places the specific function of the 
reflective faculty of judgment and its a priori principle. 
The principle of the reflective faculty of judgment is the condition that 
allows us to have a meaningful experience of the manifold forms of nature 
left out of (or left indeterminate by) the first Critique. This is the basis for 
Kant’s argument outlining the insufficiency of determinant judgment to its 
task once we are facing nature in the infinite variety of its manifold 
empirical forms. Kant’s chief point is to introduce—with the necessity of a 
―must‖—our need to appeal to an entirely new principle. ―[T]here are such 
manifold forms of nature, so many modifications as it were of the universal 
transcendental concepts of nature left indeterminate by those laws . . . that 
there must also be laws for this manifold of forms and modifications.‖34 
Empirical laws of nature are neither deduced nor inferred; they are given 
to our understanding on the basis of the fact that ―there are such manifold 
forms.‖ Kant holds that since a manifold of empirical laws actually exists, 
they must owe their lawfulness to an a priori necessary principle (this is 
an inference from the very notion of law). However, the understanding 
that legislates over ―nature in general‖ is no longer legislative in ―the 
labyrinth of the manifold of possible particular laws.‖35 In this apparently 
chaotic labyrinth, the understanding is suddenly dumb: ―it cannot say a 
word‖ concerning such laws, confesses Kant in the First Introduction,36 
recognizing that the very ―concept of a system according to these 
(empirical) laws is thoroughly alien to the understanding.‖37 The point is 
that particular empirical laws cannot be deduced from the transcendental 
laws of nature in a merely analytical way. Particular laws are indeed 
―modifications‖ of the universal concepts of nature (as their 
applications),
38
 but the transition from the universal to the particular is the 
problem the understanding cannot solve. Crucially, there is no deductive 
transition from experience in general to a system of empirical laws. Hence, 
in the perspective of the understanding, a gap of legislation seems to 
threaten the world of nature—the idea of systematicity and order is at odds 
with the idea of a manifold of empirical laws, which rather conjures up the 
 
 
 34. KANT, JUDGMENT, supra note 1, at 179–80, at 18–20. 
 35. Id. at 214’, at 402. 
 36. Id. at 193’, at 383. 
 37. Id. at 203’, at 392. 
 38. Id. at 179, at 18–19. 
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image of the labyrinth. And yet, empirical laws are still laws of nature. 
With the term ―nature‖ Kant invariably indicates a system of phenomena 
regulated by laws, never a disconnected aggregate of empirically given 
events. It follows that empirical laws must be somehow necessary even 
though ―our understanding‖ cannot but regard them as ―contingent.‖39 The 
labyrinth of nature is not chaos: there must be a way of navigating it; to 
find such a way is precisely the issue at hand. From the fact that nature is 
present to us in its manifold manifestations and that neither the 
understanding nor the determinant faculty of judgment can provide us with 
rules for thinking of those manifold forms in their empirical specificity, it 
follows that we ―must‖ assume that the empirical laws that determine 
those forms owe their ―necessity‖ to a different ―principle of the unity of 
the manifold.‖40 We must assume ―this principle‖ even though, at this 
point, what this principle is still remains ―unknown to us.‖41 Kant claims 
that this principle must be the principle of the unity of an empirical 
manifold (i.e., a principle that guarantees the systematicity of the empirical 
and particular components of our experience of nature). What is needed is 
the reflective faculty of judgment as the only faculty that is capable of 
finding out the universal rule for a particular empirical case. Since this 
faculty cannot be reduced to the understanding and its laws, it must 
display its own principle. Accordingly, the principle of the unity of the 
empirical manifold must be a principle for the reflective faculty of 
judgment and for this faculty only. 
A passage of the 1781 edition of the Transcendental Deduction shows 
an early awareness of the issue at stake: 
However exaggerated and absurd it may sound to say that the 
understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and so of its 
formal unity, such an assertion in nonetheless correct and is in 
keeping with the object to which it refers, namely experience. 
Certainly, empirical laws as such can never derive their origin from 
the pure understanding. That is as little possible as to conceive 
completely the inexhaustible multiplicity of appearances merely by 
reference to the pure form of sensible intuition. But all empirical 
laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of the 
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understanding, under which, and according to the norm of which, 
they first become possible.
42
 
While under the condition of Kant’s Copernican revolution the claim that 
the understanding is legislative with regard to the universal laws of nature 
can easily be accepted, the (transcendental) relation between the 
understanding’s laws and nature’s empirical laws seems much harder to 
conceive, let alone to justify. Although within the horizon of the first 
Critique the ―origin‖ of nature’s empirical laws is not yet at issue, Kant 
remarks that such laws have the status of ―special determinations‖ of the 
universal laws of the understanding that make them possible. The non-
analytical and non-deductive relation between these two orders of law and 
the problems that arise from that relation eventually lead to the 
investigation of the Critique of Judgment but do not seem clear to Kant at 
this point. This awareness emerges instead dramatically in the crucial 
footnote to section two in the Critique of Judgment in which Kant presents 
the problem left open by the first Critique as follows: 
The possibility of an experience in general is the possibility of 
empirical cognitions as synthetic judgments. Hence this possibility 
cannot be derived analytically from a mere comparison of 
perceptions . . . for the connection of two different perceptions in 
the concept of an object (to yield a cognition of it) is a synthesis, 
and the only way in which this synthesis makes empirical cognition, 
i.e., experience, possible is through principles [(Prinzipien)] of the 
synthetic unity of appearances, i.e., through principles 
[(Grundsätze)] by which they are brought under the categories. 
Now these empirical cognitions do form an analytic unity of all 
experience according to that which they necessarily have in 
common (namely those transcendental laws of nature), but they do 
not form that synthetic unity of experience as a system that connects 
the empirical laws even according to that in which they differ (and 
where their diversity can be infinite).
43
 
This text has not been included in the published introduction even though 
its content is integrally maintained in section five. It has been suggested 
that one of the reasons for not including this passage in the final 
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introduction was probably the striking contrast between the main thesis of 
the first Critique and the claim that the synthetic principles of the 
understanding form, after all, a merely analytic unity and, despite all the 
first Critique tried to demonstrate, have a merely analytical function.
44
  
In the first Critique a priori principles and judgments make experience 
possible insofar as—and precisely because—they are synthetic. In the 
horizon of the Critique of Judgment, Kant contends that those synthetic a 
priori principles contain that which all our empirical cognitions ―have 
necessarily in common‖; hence that on the basis of the synthetic a priori 
principles (the transcendental laws of nature), ―the analytic unity of all 
experience‖ first becomes possible. Strikingly, however, Kant now admits 
that the synthetic a priori principles still do not make possible ―that 
synthetic unity of experience as a system that connects under one principle 
empirical laws also according to that in which they differ.‖ Clearly, in this 
passage, Kant presents as analytic what the first Critique claims instead to 
be synthetic (i.e., the unity of nature—whereby the ambiguity of ―nature‖ 
once taken as nature in general, once taken as nature in its empirical laws 
should be underscored), thereby advancing the further need to guarantee 
the synthetic unity of the manifold empirical forms of experience. Those 
same transcendental principles that the first Critique demonstrates to be 
synthetic are recognized here as a merely analytic function. Although 
logically their synthetic nature is not repealed, Kant now assesses their 
transcendental role within the process of our empirical cognition of nature. 
The focus has changed from the order of nature in general to the manifold 
of nature’s empirical forms. With regard to this further problem, those 
transcendental principles provide (only) the analytic unity of experience in 
general by expressing that which all experiences have in common. Yet, 
since they cannot say anything regarding how different empirical laws 
actually differ from each other, they cannot ground the synthetic unity of 
empirical cognitions or the system of empirical laws of nature. 
Both the work of the understanding and the work of determinant 
judgment take place in a realm where phenomena and objects are viewed 
as completely homogeneous. This is the world of nature in general. Its 
universal laws tell us what empirical objects have necessarily in common 
but nothing more than that. The synthetic a priori principles of the 
understanding provide us with no information regarding how empirical 
objects and events differ in their specificity since they cannot account for a 
world whose composition is fundamentally heterogeneous. To be sure, on 
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the basis of those principles alone we would not even be able to 
distinguish one object from the other as a specifically and empirically 
determined object (and not just as appearance in general). A star, a flower, 
a beam of light are homogeneous things insofar as they are all appearances 
in space and time, all have a degree, stand in reciprocal connection, and so 
on. These features, however, by simply constituting the necessary 
conditions of the possibility of these objects as phenomena of nature—and 
hence the necessary conditions of their being, for us, objects of possible 
experience—are only conditions that all objects have necessarily in 
common. These conditions are indeed necessary in order to qualify those 
objects as objects of nature in general, but they do not specify them in 
their empirical difference, specificity, or individuality (i.e., precisely as a 
star, a flower, a beam of light—and even less as this star, flower, etc.).  
The issue of what makes the specific difference of our empirical 
cognition of things in nature—the problem of the synthetic unity of 
experience and of empirical laws insofar as they are heterogeneous—is the 
peculiar problem addressed by the reflective faculty of judgment and its 
―special‖ a priori principle. In light of this new problem of synthesis, 
nature in its manifold forms raises new questions. If the ―succession of the 
determinations of one and the same thing‖ (change) is the condition that 
guarantees the possibility of subsuming a given case under the universal 
law of causality, and if our judgment is supposed to determine our object 
for us in this way, then we must recognize that such determination is 
fundamentally insufficient when at stake is our experience of empirical 
particulars. For we can easily recognize that 
besides that formal condition of time, objects of empirical cognition 
are further determined in a multiplicity of ways, or as far as we can 
judge a priori, are determinable in a multiplicity of ways so that 
specifically different natures, apart from what they have in common 
as belonging to nature in general, can still be causes in an infinite 
variety of ways.
45
 
What we need to know in this case is the specific cause (among many 
possible causes) of a particular given effect. When facing this problem, we 
cannot be satisfied with the general claim that all change has a cause. 
There is a broad empirical realm of possible determination, or a range of 
―determinability,‖ that both the understanding with its universal laws and 
determinant judgment in its application of them inevitably leave 
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indeterminate. This argument marks out the jurisdiction of the reflective 
faculty of judgment in the Critique of Judgment. 
The necessity of the principle of formal purposiveness arises from the 
contemplation of an epistemologically dreadful scenario. At issue is the 
impossibility of deducing particular empirical laws from universal 
transcendental principles of nature, empirical cognitions from universal 
concepts, heterogeneity from homogeneity. ―It is quite conceivable,‖46 
Kant contends, that we could be fully cognizant of the world of nature in 
general in its universal laws and still have no clue as to how to provide an 
explanation of the specific differences we encounter in our experience of 
nature. A meaningful experience would be, in this case, properly 
impossible. We would feel trapped in nature’s labyrinth with no sense of a 
way out. If we could not appeal to the principle of reflection, i.e., to the 
principle of purposiveness, we would face a world in which the specific 
differences among natural things would be so numerous as to be utterly 
ungraspable; no order would be discernible and hence no comprehension 
possible; heterogeneity would be infinite and hence irreducible to a finite 
number of rules so that any attempt at subordination of genera and species 
would necessarily fail. In this world, despite the retained and recognized 
validity of nature’s universal laws, everything would appear in a state of 
confusion and chaos. Nature would be indeed a chaotic labyrinth. It 
follows that in order for empirical heterogeneity to be conceivable, 
systematicity must be assumed. And systematicity implies the principle of 
―purposiveness‖ (Zweckmäßigkeit). 
In the footnote to section five of the First Introduction, Kant presents 
the relation between the heterogeneity of nature’s forms and their 
interconnection into a systematic unity as a fundamental presupposition of 
science: 
One may wonder whether Linnaeus could ever have hoped to 
design a system of nature if he had had to worry that a stone that he 
found and that he called granite might differ in its inner character 
from any other stone even if it looked the same, so that all he could 
ever hope to find would be single things—isolated, as it were, for 
the understanding—but never a class of them that could be brought 
under concepts of genera and species.
47
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The empirical sciences do not aim only at providing analytical 
classifications of objects on the basis of their homogeneity. The empirical 
sciences also need to establish laws that allow one to unify classes of 
objects according to their specific differences. The predicament that Kant 
faces in the deduction of the principle of reflective judgment can be 
compared, in one respect, to the one that leads to the transcendental 
deduction of the categories in the first Critique. Herein Kant argues that 
since ―the categories of the understanding . . . do not represent the 
conditions under which objects are given in intuition,‖ the world 
represented by the conditions of sensibility could very well be thought as 
completely disconnected from the world of the understanding. In this case, 
―objects would still appear to us without their having to be necessarily 
related to the functions of the understanding.‖48 Hence the need for a 
transcendental deduction of the categories that is not required for the 
forms of intuition: 
[A]ppearances might very well be so constituted that the 
understanding should not find them to be in accordance with the 
conditions of its unity. Everything might be in such confusion that, 
for instance, in the series of appearances nothing presented itself 
that might yield a rule of synthesis and so answer to the concept of 
cause and effect. This concept would then be altogether empty, null, 
and meaningless. But since intuition stands in no need whatsoever 
of the functions of thought, appearances would nonetheless present 
objects to our intuition.
49
 
No experience would be possible in this ―confusion‖ but only a rhapsody 
of perceptions. The predicament outlined in section five is somehow 
parallel to the one just examined. It is, however, placed on a different level 
of experience. If we did not assume the possible unity of a system of 
experience (or the synthetic unity of nature’s manifold particular forms), 
every given particular would subsist separately from all others and we 
would have no possibility of connecting them in a meaningful way. In this 
world, Linnaeus would never have been able to recognize and construct an 
ordered system of nature—but in this world natural beauty would also not 
be connected with the meaningful experience that produces a peculiar 
aesthetic pleasure in us. And yet, significantly, in the Critique of Judgment 
the possibility that the empirical manifold of nature’s forms were 
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disconnected from the world ruled by the understanding’s legislation is not 
raised as the basis for a deduction. Insofar as the principle of formal 
purposiveness is concerned, the still persisting possibility of facing a 
chaotic world restates the validity of a principle that is only regulative, 
heuristic, and subjectively necessary, employed for reflection and not for 
the determination of objects. 
To conclude, following the principle of the reflective faculty of 
judgment, we can assume that ―nature specifies its universal laws 
according to the principle of purposiveness for our cognitive faculty,‖50 
and that the heterogeneity of nature’s forms responds to an order fully 
comprehensible to the human mind. Thereby it becomes possible to find 
the universal for a particular case empirically given in perception—a 
problem that neither the understanding nor the determinant faculty of 
judgment could solve. Furthermore, it becomes possible to establish 
connections among a manifold of different empirical cases, and hence to 
arrange our empirical cognitions in the coherent unity of a system. This 
arranging is the work of the reflective faculty of judgment. Its principle 
defines the limits of our searching endeavors with regard to nature’s 
empirical laws and is the transcendental ground common to our aesthetic 
and teleological experience of nature in its manifold particular forms. 
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